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Abstract 
The paper presents a probabilistic method for projecting the number of households and 
their distribution by size. The method combines probabilistic population projection with 
a probabilistic headship rates model. In order to distribute the households by size, we 
use recently developed models for conditional proportions of households of different 
sizes among households of the same size or bigger. Models are approbated on the case 
of Russia with the fertility scenario assuming the considerable success of demographic 
policies recently introduced in the country. The parameters for household models are 
estimated from the 2002 census using bootstrap procedures and from assumptions about 
the possibility of headship rates at young ages to reach levels reported for Sweden. Our 
results show significant changes in the future distribution of private households in 
Russia. Despite the overall decline in the number of households, our results imply a 
persistent shortage of housing infrastructure for four-person households. Typically these 
would be the households of two parents with two children, i.e., those families that are 
the focus of the recently introduced demographic policies. 
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Probabilistic Household Projections based on an 
Extension of the Headship Rates Method with an 
Application to the Case of Russia 
Sergei Scherbov and Dalkhat Ediev 
1  Introduction 
Household projections are important for planning purposes and for analyzing the 
implications of population dynamics for consumption, labor, ecology, etc. (MacKellar et 
al. 1995; O’Neill and Chen 2002; Perz 2001; Prskawetz et al. 2004). In some areas, like 
housing and urban planning, projections of the distribution of households by size are of 
key importance, as they are relevant to decisions involving substantial long-term public 
and private expenditures. It is important for such applications to have a better 
knowledge of the trends expected in the future as well as the uncertainty accompanying 
such trends. Understanding the uncertainty of a household’s prospects is important, as it 
is not always possible to easily and quickly adjust investment decisions to deviations 
from the projected trend. This issue is also important for developing demographic and 
taxation policies based on family and household composition. This work utilizes recent 
advances in modeling household distribution by size and in probabilistic projections to 
develop probabilistic household projections for Russia in 2005-2050. 
In household projections, internally consistent reflection of the expected future is 
of core importance. In a scenario with fertility rising due to successful policy based on 
second-order births, the number of households with four and more members must rise. 
Similarly, in an aging population, two- and single-person households should increase in 
number due to an increased proportion of elderly. Deriving consistent distributions of 
households by type and of persons by household position is not a simple task even when 
these distributions are based on census data, i.e., when we know that the data source is 
consistent by itself. It is even less easy in the case of projections, as the projected, i.e., 
artificial, population proportions may lack consistency. A common way to tackle such 
inconsistencies would be to apply some adjustments or reconciliation procedures, which 
restore consistency with respect to the most important distributions at least. The 
problems are worse in the case of probabilistic projections: First, it is easy to get 
unrealistic population structures while generating future populations at random and, 
second, the application of reconciliation procedures is not a desired option as it may 
uncontrollably distort the probabilistic assumptions upon which the projection is built. 
In view of these problems and keeping in mind the importance of practical applications, 
we build our work on the simplest method for household projection and confine the 
complexity of the output to the number of households and their distribution by size 
only. We use the most traditional and simple headship rates method based on age-
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specific headship rates, i.e., on proportions of household heads, without considering the 
status of the head, except for the age. In particular, we do not differentiate heads by sex 
and by type or size of the household, as the headship rates broken down by these 
characteristics would be erratic and highly correlated to fertility and mortality 
assumptions as well as to the cultural context. Age-specific headship rates, in contrast, 
are more stable and less correlated to projection assumptions. We use these rates to 
generate the overall number and, consequently, the average household size. From the 
average size, the distribution of households by size is generated, using recently 
developed models. Such a strategy pays off, as the population size and, therefore, the 
average size and distribution of households by size adequately reflect the implications 
of the population projection assumptions. 
The case of Russia deserves special attention for several reasons. During the last 
century the country passed through many dramatic social and economic disturbances, 
which made deep imprints in the age structure of the population and have serious 
implications for demographic prospects (Ediev 2001). An almost inevitable de-
population of the country and changes in the age structure may have significant and, 
sometimes, contradictive effects on the prospects of households of different sizes. At the 
same time, the country is facing an urgent need for better planning and improvement of 
the infrastructure and living arrangements in particular, hence, the importance of 
understanding the prospects and uncertainty of household dynamics in the future. 
2  Methodology and Data 
This work is based on an extension of the conventional headship rates method (United 
States National Resources Planning Committee 1938; United Nations 1973). Several 
rationales support this choice. The headship rates method and its extensions are widely 
used by government agencies, despite progress in more sophisticated modeling of 
households. Age-specific headship rates happen to be remarkably stable indices, which 
vary only moderately despite significant demographic developments observed in many 
populations. Changes in fertility and mortality have only a limited effect on headship 
rates. Population age structure is a primary source of variations of household numbers 
and distribution (see the Appendix for some analytical results in support of this view 
and implications for a stable population). At older ages mortality and morbidity may 
play a more significant role as a factor of headship rates dynamics. Yet this effect may 
be neglected in a study of the overall number of households, to which this work is 
devoted. More importantly, headship rates at young ages may increase considerably due 
to earlier separation of youth from parental households. We take the latter effect into 
account, assuming a possible increase in headship rates at young ages. 
The need for probabilistic household forecasting has been acknowledged 
elsewhere (see, for example, De Beer and Alders 1999; Leiwen and O’Neill 2004). De 
Beer and Alders forecast uncertainty in the future number of households and introduce a 
number of assumptions regarding institutional population, probability of changes in the 
age at leaving the parental home, assumptions about the conditional probability of 
changes in the percentage of people living alone, etc. In order to derive these 
assumptions, a very good information base should be available. From the data available 
for Russia, deriving such a distribution would require too much subjective judgment. 
Leiwen and O’Neill propose an extension of the headship rates method by introducing 
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age- and household size-specific headship rates. The latter rates were proposed to be 
derived as functions of demographic indicators, such as the propensity of leaving home, 
marriage, divorce, fertility rates, and mortality. Such an approach seems to be 
promising, as it demands less data and fewer model assumptions compared to the micro-
simulation approach. It also allows us to address the role of demographic events in a 
household’s formation. In some applications, however, there might not be enough data 
for the model. Also, the extension to the method may require special reconciliation 
procedures in order to guarantee internal consistency of the projection, which may limit 
its application, especially in probabilistic projections. For example, the total population 
in private households obtained from their model distribution by size might be 
inconsistent with the size of the actual population in private households. Another 
potential drawback is the use of parameters, which are quite volatile and involve non-
trivial correlations between them. For example, size/age-specific headship rates may 
vary considerably across time and regions, depending on the prevailing fertility levels, 
while age-specific headship rates derived regardless of the household characteristics are 
usually much more stable, i.e., the former rates are negatively correlated. Usage of such 
model parameters may worsen performance and robustness of the probabilistic model 
and increase demand for data availability and quality. 
This paper presents an approach that is based on the extension of the headship 
rates method. The extension we use is based on deriving the distribution of households 
by size from the overall average household size, which, in turn, is derived from the 
conventional age-specific headship rates. The approach was proposed by Gisser (1986a, 
1986b) and has been used in Austrian household projections ever since. One 
advantageous feature of the approach is that the average household size indirectly 
reflects the demographic developments, even though headship rates might be less 
sensitive to those developments. In particular, changes in fertility assumed in population 
projection will, in fact, affect population size and, thereby, the average household size. 
Unfortunately, like many other extensions of the headship rates method, the approach 
may eventually result in inconsistent projections, and special reconciliation procedures 
are to be used, which somewhat limits its usage in probabilistic projections. For 
example, the sum of the proportions of households of different sizes may deviate from 
one, or the population totals obtained directly from the age structure or from the 
distribution of households by size may differ considerably. Merits of the approach may 
be used to a wider extent, based on recent developments of models for conditional 
shares of households among households of the same or larger size and for average sizes 
of such households (Ediev 2007) (see details below). 
We use conventional age-specific headship rates (eventually generated at 
random, as described below) to derive the number of households from the projected 
population by age and to obtain the average household size. Then we apply a 
conditional shares approach to derive the number of households by size. 
The general scheme of household projection adopted in this paper is presented in 
Chart 1. Basically, two tasks are identified: making population projections and 
projecting the number of households by size, based on population projections. In the 
case of probabilistic projections, this sequence is repeated a given number of times. 
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Chart 1. Projection of the number of households. 
2.1  Population projections 
Population projections were prepared using a probabilistic approach. This approach has 
been applied successfully in many instances to project the population at national, 
macro-region and global levels (Lutz et al. 1997, 2001, 2004; Lutz and Scherbov 1998; 
Keilman et al. 2002). Three main approaches to probabilistic projections are proposed in 
the scientific literature. The first approach is based on the time-series analysis of past 
vital rates; the second is based on the analysis of past projection errors; and the third is 
based on expert opinion. A good overview of these approaches is given by Bongaarts 
and Bulatao (2000) and Booth (2006). The three approaches are not mutually exclusive 
but often complementary. In particular, expert judgment is implicitly or explicitly 
considered in all of them. The third approach, the one adopted here, explicitly uses 
expert opinion. Expert-based population projections were first proposed in the scientific 
literature by Lutz et al. (1996). Further use and development of the method can be found 
in Lutz et al. (1997, 1999, 2001, 2004) and Lutz and Scherbov (1998). 
There are many sources of uncertainty in the future development of fertility, 
mortality and migration. The recent introduction of a new demographic policy in Russia 
makes the situation even more uncertain. The main aim of the policy was to increase the 
number of second births. It is not clear how the population will react to the new 
measures aimed at fertility stimulation. It is not clear whether the number of second 
births will increase in cohorts of women or whether a shift in the birth calendar will 
occur without essential changes in the completed fertility of cohorts. 
In our projections we assumed that population policy will bring certain positive 
results. We assumed that this will lead, first, to a shortening of the interval between first 
and second births and, second, to an increase in the number of second births by 50 
percent. Those assumptions result in the increase of projected mean values of period 
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TFR (total fertility rate) to 1.5 in 2008, peaking at 1.76 in 2014 and declining afterwards 
and remaining constant at the level of 1.7 starting from 2027. The range of uncertainty 
in 2050 covers the interval of TFR from 1.25 to 2.15 children per woman. 
In the case of life expectancy, we assumed that the lower end of the 90 percent 
range corresponds to no future increase in life expectancy for both males and females. 
The upper end corresponds to growth in life expectancy of about two years per decade 
for females and 2.8 years per decade for males, thus decreasing the gap that exists 
between life expectancy of males and females. This result in mean predicted values of 
life expectancy in 2050 equals to 71.3 and 81.7 years of life for males and females, 
respectively. 
The mean predicted value of the number of net migrants was considered 
constant and equal to 126,000 people coming annually to Russia. The range between 0 
and 256,000 is assumed to cover 90 percent of all the future outcomes of net migration. 
In order to generate the required distributions of the future path of fertility, 
mortality and migration, we adopted the method used by Lutz et al. (2001). The starting 
year of projection was 2005. The data on population, fertility, mortality and migration 
for this year were utilized. Age-specific fertility rates were preliminarily smoothed 
using the mixed Gamma distribution function. Age-specific mortality rates were 
smoothed using the Heligman-Pollard mortality schedule. Projections were made for 
single-year age groups and are thus carried out on a yearly basis. 
2.2  Deriving the number of households by size 
After making the population projections, the next step is to obtain the total number of 
private households. To do that we apply age-specific institutional population 
proportions to the projected population in order to obtain the population living in private 
households. Then we apply age-specific headship rates to the population living in 
private households in order to get the total number of private households (Chart 1). 
Proportions of the institutional population were fixed at the level observed in the 2002 
census.1 Headship rates for the starting year are derived from 2002 census data using the 
bootstrap method. In order to avoid biases caused by artificial geographic compositions 
generated in bootstrap, we pull stratified samples, pooling together regions with similar 
average sizes of households. Two groups of regions were defined: those with an average 
household size below 3 persons and those above 3. After 2005, headship rates at young 
ages are allowed to increase. This is probabilistically done in two steps. First, for 2050 
we set a target value for headship rates distributed uniformly between the lower and 
upper levels, which are derived consequently from the level set for 2005 and from the 
data on headship rates for Sweden (United Nations 1997). For the years between 2005 
and 2050, the headship rates are set to follow linear increasing trends. 
Based on the generated number of households, the average size is calculated as 
the ratio of the number of households to the population in private households. The α  
method from (Ediev 2007) is applied to size after size: 
                                                 
1
 The number of people in institutional households comprises 1.6 percent of all the population. This 
percentage varies across age and sex. 
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kkekk
ηαν ⋅−+ =/ , (1) 
where +kk /ν  is the conditional share of households with k members among households 
of the same or larger size, kη  is the average size of such households minus k, and kα  
are model parameters. The parameters kα  are obtained from regressions against the 
average household size, which are also derived from the bootstrap procedure based on 
stratified data of the 1994 micro-census. 
The procedure begins with the smallest households, i.e., one-person households. 
The average size for households of the next size is obtained recurrently by subtracting 
the number and the population residing in the households of the preceding size. ( ) 1
1
1
/
1 −−=+−− ⋅−= ++++ kkkkk kkk kHH HkN νηη , (2) 
where kH  and +kH  are the numbers of households of size k and of the same or larger 
size; +kN  is the population residing in households with k or more members. 
3  Results 
To study the sensitivity of the results to assumptions concerning headship rates, we used 
three different approaches in developing our projections. The first approach was based 
on directly applying headship rates obtained from the Russian census. Our probabilistic 
projection set contained 1,000 simulations. For each simulation we stored age-specific 
population distributions for every projected year. Then we applied fixed age-specific 
headship rates obtained for Russia as a whole to each population composition, thus 
deriving the total number of households.2 In the next step we calculated the average size 
of the household for each simulation and distributed the total number of households by 
the number of households of each size. Since we used probabilistic age-specific 
population distributions, we also obtained the probabilistic distribution of the number of 
households of different sizes. 
In a second approach, the algorithm of the distribution of the number of 
households by size was similar, except we used random headship rates. They were 
obtained using the bootstrap procedure described above and without using the Swedish 
rates to set target values for headship rates in 2050. In the third approach, we used 
headship rates from the bootstrap procedure for the base year and allowed for a possible 
increase by 2050 as described above. 
The resulting distributions of households by size were close in these approaches 
with the random headship rates approach having a slightly higher variance. Thus we 
will present the results of only those cases where we applied random headship rates with 
the Swedish rates used to set a target level for headship rates in 2050, up to which the 
rates increase linearly in 2005-2050. 
                                                 
2
 Since we are interested in the population living in private households, we adjusted the projected 
population with the proportion of people living in private households obtained from the 2002 census. 
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4  Population and Households: A General Overview of 
Prospects 
First of all, let us look at the probabilistic population projection for Russia. Figure 1 
presents the fractals of this distribution. As we observe from this figure, there is 
virtually no chance for population growth in the future. This is predefined by very low 
fertility and high mortality levels. Low fertility will also have implications for the total 
number of households. The total number of households is projected to decline in the 
long term (Figure 2). In the short term, the next 10-15 years, the median number of 
households is going to increase slightly, even though the fertility level is low. After that 
period, a steady decline is expected and by 2050 the number of households may fall to 
47 million from 52.5 million in 2005. The 95 percent uncertainty range will spread from 
41.5 to 52.4 million households in 2050. 
 
 
Russia, Total Population
0.00
20.00
40.00
60.00
80.00
100.00
120.00
140.00
160.00
20
00
20
05
20
10
20
15
20
20
20
25
20
30
20
35
20
40
20
45
20
50
20
55
Year
To
ta
l P
o
pu
la
tio
n
 
(m
ill
io
n
s) 0.8
0.4
0.2
0.025
0.975
Median0.6
Fractiles
Sergei's DELL PIII, file: D:\IIASA2006\Russia\Model_tacis\res_fert_policy\[presentation02_RUS_indic_files_for_tacis.xls],29-Nov-06    19:24
Figure 1.  Probabilistic population projection for Russia. 
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Russia, Distribution of the Total Number of Households
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Figure 2.  Distribution of the total number of households in Russia, projection for 2005-
2050. 
 
Not only is the total number of households projected to decline, but households 
will become smaller (Figure 3). Median household size falls from 2.69 in 2005 to 2.5 in 
2035 and after that stays almost constant. In 2035, the 95 percent prediction interval 
includes households with sizes between 2.4 and 2.6 members. In general the decline in 
fertility leads to the decline of an average household size. This process is also partially 
due to the aging of the population structure as elderly tend to live in smaller households. 
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Russia, Distribution of the Average size of Household
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Figure 3.  Distribution of the average household size in Russia, 2005-2050. 
 
Even though the total number of households is expected to decline, we may 
expect diverse trends if we study the dynamics of households of different sizes (Figures 
4-8). In the near future we may observe the rise in the number of households of size one 
from 11.5 million in 2005 to almost 13 million in 2035 (Figure 4). Households of size 
two and three show either no change or a very slight decrease in the near future with a 
moderate decrease by 2050 (Figures 5 and 6). The strongest decline will be observed in 
households with four and more members (Figures 7 and 8). The small variation of the 
number of households with four members at the base year is mere coincidence: The 
number of these households is at the maximum level, given the observed population size 
and average household size; therefore, this number is less sensitive to changes in model 
parameters. We may expect that households of size four will decline by 20 percent and 
of size 5 by 60 percent by 2050. Typically that would be households consisting of two 
parents and two or three children. 
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Russia, Distribution of Households of  Size 1
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Figure 4.  Distribution of size one households in Russia, 2005-2050. 
 
 
Russia, Distribution of Households of  Size 2
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Figure 5.  Distribution of size two households in Russia, 2005-2050. 
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Russia, Distribution of Households of  Size 3
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Figure 6.  Distribution of size three households in Russia, 2005-2050. 
 
Russia, Distribution of Households of  Size 4
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Figure 7.  Distribution of size four households in Russia, 2005-2050. 
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Russia, Distribution of Households of  Size 5
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Figure 8.  Distribution of size five households in Russia, 2005-2050. 
 
Another way to look at the future distribution of households by size and to track 
the uncertainty associated with those distributions, is to present the distribution of 
households by size for a particular time point (Figures 9-10). From Figure 9 we may 
observe that there is virtually no chance that the number of households with four and 
more members will be higher in 2025 than it was in 2005. In 2050 a similar statement 
could be made regarding households with three and more members (Figure 10). 
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Russia, Distribution of Households by Size
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Figure 9.  Distribution of household size in 2025 in Russia. 
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Figure 10.  Distribution of household size in 2050 in Russia. 
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5  Conclusions 
In this paper we presented the first probabilistic projections of the number of 
households in Russia. How can these projections be used? What type of questions are 
we able to answer with these results? 
One of the extremely important issues in Russia today is the availability of 
housing. Many families and households live in apartments where several people share 
one room. However, social norms of housing per person exist, depending on the size of 
the household.3 Using these norms and assuming that they stay constant in the future, it 
is relatively easy to calculate the probabilistic demand for housing in Russia. Figure 11 
presents the results of these calculations. The dotted line markers designate the existing 
availability (in 2002) of housing in millions of square meters that is occupied by 
households of different sizes. The vertical bars represent the demand for housing by 
household size calculated using social norms standards. 
As we see from Figure 11, households with one or two members occupy even 
more housing space than would correspond to social norms. There might be several 
reasons for that. First of all, the distribution of housing is extremely uneven. Two 
households of the same size may live in very different housing conditions. However one 
of the explanations of excessive available housing is that many of the households of this 
type consist of an elderly person living alone. Usually this person will have a bigger 
apartment, since at one time he/she was living together with a spouse and probably 
children. The children have since left home, the spouse has died, and the apartment or 
house (usually in a rural area) is occupied by only one person. 
The most alarming situation is the availability of housing for households with 
four members. Typically that would be two parents living with two children. Since the 
demographic policy adopted in Russia today is aimed at a second child, housing 
facilities for households consisting of four members should be available. Our projection 
suggests that the number of households of size four is expected to decline. Despite the 
decline in numbers, however, these households will face a shortage of housing supply, if 
the situation with housing availability does not improve (Figure 12). Even if there might 
be enough housing existing in 2025 for households with five and more members, due to 
a very strong decline in the number of such households, the lack of housing for 
households with four members will almost certainly be a problem, if there is no 
considerable increase in the housing stock for households with four members. 
 
                                                 
3
 Decree of the President of the Russian Federation Nr. 425 of April 28, 1997 “On Housing and Utility 
Sector Reform in the Russian Federation”. 
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Figure 11.  Supply and demand for housing in Russia in 2005. 
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Figure 12.  Supply and demand for housing in Russia in 2025. 
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Appendix:  Private Households by Size in a Stable Population 
 
1. Headship rates 
Let ( )txP ; , ( )txH ; , ( ) ( ) ( )txHtxPtxM ;;; −= , and ( ) ( )( )txP txHtxh ;;; =  be the population 
in private households, household heads, non-head members of households, and headship 
rates at age x.4 We suppose the following simplified model determining the evolvement 
of these functions. First, the dynamics of the number of heads is determined by 
mortality and also by the formation of new households. Death of the head implies that 
all other household members move to other existing households, rather than forming a 
new household.5 Second, the formation of new households occurs by separation from 
existing households and happens at some fixed age-specific rates ( )xg . Third, we apply 
the same age-specific death rates to both heads and non-head members. These 
simplifying assumptions allow separating the two processes and lead to the following 
differential equation for the population of non-head members of households: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )txMxgtxMtxtxM
x
txM
t
;;;;; −−=∂∂+∂∂ μ .    (A1) 
From Eq. (A1), which is written in terms of the non-head population only, it is possible 
to derive the following relation for that population: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )∫=∫−= −++−− xx dyygdyygyxty etxPextMtxM 00 ;;0; ;μ ,    (A2) 
where we suppose that there are no heads of age zero (i.e., ( ) ( )tMtP ;0;0 = ) and use the 
following traditional relation for the dynamics of the size of birth cohort: 
( ) ( ) ( )∫−= +−− x dyyxtyextPtxP 0 ;;0; μ .       (A3) 
The population of heads may be obtained as the difference between the population total 
and the non-head population: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎜⎝
⎛ ∫−=−= − x dyygetxPtxMtxPtxH 01;;;; .      (A4) 
This allows obtaining the headship rates: 
                                                 
4
 For the sake of simplicity and also to avoid uncertainty related to the sex of the household head, we do 
not address sex, although it may be added to the study. 
5
 In fact, the emergence of new households due to the death of the head of an existing household may be 
reflected indirectly in the proposed model through the age-specific rates of changing status from “non-
head” to “head”. 
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( ) ( )( ) ( )∫−== − x dyygetxP txHtxh 01;;; .       (A5) 
Hence, headship rates are constant and do not directly depend on the reproduction 
regimen of the population as long as the age-specific rates of separating to new 
households are fixed. This result may be extended to the case of a varying rate of new 
household formation ( )txg ; : 
( ) ( )∫−= +−− x dyyxtygetxh 0 ;1; .        (A6) 
In this more general case, again, mortality and fertility are not directly involved in 
headship rates. In the model proposed, the reverse transitions from ‘head’ status to ‘non-
head’ status were neglected. Hence, the solutions in Eqs. (A5) and (A6) – under non-
negative rates of transition from non-head status to head status – are ever increasing by 
age. In real populations, there is a slight decrease in the headship rates for the oldest old 
ages, as the elderly may join the households of their kin rather than continuing to keep 
their own households. However, this decline in headship rates may also offer more 
options for stating the ‘household head’ in the census in households with several 
generations cohabiting together and also reflect the cohort effects on headship rates. 
In any case, the headship rates seem to be much less sensitive to variations in 
reproduction regimes compared to, say, population size and age structure. This explains 
the remarkable stability of headship rates in human populations and also provides a 
rationale in support of the headship rates method. This point is also supported by 
empirical data (e.g., Leiwen and O’Neill 2004; Ediev 2007): Age-specific headship 
rates are remarkably stable, when no details concerning the household size or type are 
concerned. 
 
2. Average household size 
Since age-specific headship rates have become less sensitive to changes in the 
reproduction regimen, one may study the consequences of a stable population’s age 
structure for number, average size, and distribution of households by size assuming 
some fixed age profile of the headship rates. Let ( )xh  be the headship rate at age x, 
which we assume to be fixed for all populations to be considered. The average 
household size, which – under the model proposed – determines their distribution by 
size, may be written as follows for a stable population: ( )
( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( )∫ ∫∫ ∫ −
−
−
− == ω ρ
ω ρ
ω ρ
ω ρ
0
0
0
0
dxxhexl
dxexl
dxxhexBl
dxexBl
n
x
x
x
x
s
,      (A7) 
where B  are births in the stable population, ( )xl  is the survivorship function, ρ  is the 
Malthusian parameter (or Lotka’s coefficient), and ω  is the maximum lifespan. 
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Headship rates are nil for children and grow rapidly to the level of about 0.6 by the age 
of 25-30. Therefore, one may use the following approximate for headship rates in Eq. 
(A7) in order to simplify the relation: ( ) ⎩⎨⎧ >≤≈ ., ,,0 min* minxxh xxxh          (A8) 
Substituting this into Eq. (A7), we have: 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) =
+=≈ ∫
∫∫
∫∫ −
−−
−
−
ω ρ
ω ρρ
ω ρ
ω ρ
min
*
min
min
0
min
*
0
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
x
s
dxexlh
dxexldxexl
dxexlh
dxexl
n  
( )
( ) ⎟⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+= ∫∫ −
−
ω ρ
ρ
min
min
0
*
11
x
x
x
x
dxexl
dxexl
h
.        (A9) 
This expression indicates that there is a lower limit for average household size in a 
stable population: 
*
1
h
n s ≥ .          (A10) 
For the usual case of headship rates of about 0.6 at most adult ages, this implies that the 
average household size in a stable population may not be lower than about 1.67, which 
– given the models proposed for household distribution by size – has apparent 
implications for limiting the proportions of households of different sizes. 
The expression on the right-hand side of Eq. (A9) depends on mortality and on 
the reproduction regimen of the population. To make these relations more explicit, let us 
use the following simplifying approximation. Let us consider, that the survivorship 
function may be approximated by a piece-wise constant function: ( ) ⎩⎨⎧ >≤≈ ,,0 ,,1 00ex exxl          (A11) 
where 0e  is the life expectancy at birth. Using this approximation, one may get from Eq. 
(A9): 
( ) 11111111 min0
0
0min
min
**0
min
min
0
* −−=⎟⎟⎠⎞⎜⎜⎝⎛ −−+=⎟⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
+≈ −−− −−
−
∫∫ xe eex xe
x
x
x
x
s
e
e
hee
e
h
dxe
dxe
h
n ρ
ρ
ρρ
ρ
ρ
ρ
.  (A12) 
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For stable populations with a reproduction level close to simple replacement, i.e., with 
Lotka’s coefficient close to zero, life expectancy at birth is the main factor of variations 
in average household size: 
min0
0
*
1
xe
e
h
n s −≈ ,         (A13) 
when 10 <<eρ . 
For a wider range of stable populations, one may use Eq. (A12) to study the 
variations of average household size.6 Figure A1 presents the results of the calculations 
using 25min =x , 6.0* =h . The figure shows explicitly that the declines in average 
household size were due mainly to improvements in life expectancy and fertility 
decline. Both processes are tightly linked to the process of demographic transition. 
Hence, the demographic transition – apart from cultural changes and reassessments of 
family values – has caused the decline in average household size. Note, however, that 
during the first stages of the transition, when mortality decline results in improvements 
of Lotka’s r, the average household size might be relatively stable or even growing. 
Later on, however, a decline in average household size must follow. 
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Figure A1. Approximates of average household size in a stable population as a function 
of life expectancy at birth and of Lotka’s coefficient (IRNI – intrinsic rate of natural 
increase). 
                                                 
6
 Numerical simulations show that the approximation Eq. (A12) works well and provides results very 
close to those obtained directly from Eq. (A7). 
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3. Distribution by size 
The distribution of households by size may be derived from their average size (Ediev 
2007) and has been described in this paper. Figure A2 presents the results of estimating 
the proportion of households of different sizes in a stable population with varying 
fertility and with life expectancy fixed at a level of 80 years. Figure A3 presents the 
results for a stable population with varying mortality and with replacement fertility. 
Changes in the population age structure associated with a fertility decline have a 
negative effect on the proportion of households with four and more members, and a 
positive effect on proportion of one- and two-person households. The proportion of 
households with three persons, however, varies only moderately even within the 
remarkably wide range of fertility levels. A rise in life expectancy has nearly the same 
effect on household distribution by size. Hence, a simultaneous fall in fertility and rise 
in life expectancy, as was observed for many populations, enhance the effects of both 
processes on household dynamics. In particular, the mere change in population age 
structure during the demographic transition process seems to be the main factor of 
emergence of the modern distribution of households with a declining share of large 
households and a dramatic growth of the share of one-person households. This is 
illustrated in Figure A4, which presents the proportion of one-person households for a 
stable population with different combinations of fertility and life expectancy. 
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Figure A2. Proportion of private households of sizes one to five in a stable population 
as a function of Lotka’s coefficient (IRNI) with a life expectancy at birth fixed at 80 
years. 
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Figure A3. Proportion of private households of sizes one to five in a stable population 
as a function of life expectancy at birth under replacement fertility. 
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Figure A4. Proportion of single-person households in a stable population as a function 
of life expectancy at birth and of Lotka’s coefficient (IRNI). 
